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Act to be or was it a declaration of the rights in both equity and law?
To grant specific performance of leases which fail to comply with
statutory requirements tends to lessen the significance of such a statute.
On the other hand there is the possibility of some hardship to a com-
plaining party in situations where the theory of a periodic tenancy is not
available. HOBERT H. BUSH
PARTNERSHIP
MARSHALING - RIGHT OF DEPOSITORS TO COMPETE WITH
INDIVIDUAL CREDITORS IN THE SEPARATE ESTATES OF THE
PARTNERS.
In 191 I a number of persons formed a co-partnership association
for the purpose of engaging in the business of general banking. The
Superintendent of Banks of the state of Ohio took over the bank in 1932
for liquidation and sued the owners of the bank for $5o,ooo alleging
that the assets of the bank were insufficient to pay the liabilities to that
extent. One of the objections made by the defendants to the main-
tenance of the suit was that firm creditors were not entitled to move
against the partners and their non-partnership property until the indi-
vidual creditors of the individual partners had obtained satisfaction of
their claims. The court, in allowing the suit, granted the correctness of
the general equitable rule contended for but said that the rule had
been modified as to the depositors in and owners of unincorporated
banks by the provisions of Section 71o-8o, General Code, and that
depositors could share in the separate assets of the partners on an equal
footing with the individual creditors. State v. Steck, 132 Ohio St. 198,
9 Ohio Bar 42, 5 N.E. (2d) 919, (1936).
Section 71o-8o reads as follows: "The depositors in any unin-
corporated bank shall have first lien on the assets of such bank, in case
it is wound up, to the extent of their several deposits, and for any
balance remaining unpaid, such depositors shall share in the general
assets of the owner or owners alike with the general creditors." De-
fendants' argument must have been that "general creditors" meant
"general creditors of the firm." Only one case had previously con-
strued this part of the section. The probate judge of Madison County
in the case of In re Johnson, 3 Ohio Op. 540 (1935), held that
"general creditors" meant "general creditors of the owner or owners."
He stated, however, that the result would be the same if the words
meant "general creditors of the firm." If the depositors, who have
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first lien on the assets of the bank, are not satisfied by these assets, then
as to the general creditors there are no firm assets, and he contended
that the rule of Brock v. Bateman, 25 Ohio St. 6o9 (874), would
apply, namely that where there are no firm assets for distribution and
no solvent partners, the firm creditors share in the assets of the indi-
vidual partners pari passu with the individual creditors. The depositors
then, being by the statute on a par with the general creditors of the
bank, would also share in the individual assets. It might be argued, of
course, that the rule of Brock v. Bateman would not apply since there
were firm assets for distribution to a preferred class of firm creditors
and that the Legislature meant to prefer the depositors to the general
creditors only to the extent that their claims could be satisfied by the
assets of the bank. The interpretation made by the Madison County
probate court and by the court in the principal case seems to be more
reasonable in the light of the Legislature's policy of protecting bank
depositors to the fullest possible extent.
The rule of distribution adopted by Section 71o-8o does not apply
generally to partnerships in Ohio. The leading Ohio case is Rodgers v.
Meranda, 7 Ohio St. 179 (1857), which adopts the majority or English
rule that firm creditors can share in the individual estates of the partners
only after individual creditors of the partners have been paid in full. The
same rule is adopted in the Bankruptcy Act, Section 5 (f), and in the
Uniform Partnership Act, Section 40 (h). As noticed above an excep-
tion is made where there are no firm assets for distribution to the
creditors and no solvent partners, Brock v. Bateman, supra, or where
the assets are negligible, In re Robb, 5 Ohio N.P. 5, 5 Ohio Dec. 227
(1897), although these exceptions are not recognized in bankruptcy,
Farmers Bank v. Ridge ilve. Bank, 240 U.S. 498, 36 Sup. Ct. 461, 6o
L. Ed. 767, L.R.A. 19 17A, 135 (1916). And even if the partner
was indebted to the firm, the firm or those who represent it cannot
compete with the separate creditors except where the partner has
wrongfully appropriated firm assets to his own use, Rodgers v. Meranda,
supra.
Rodgers v. Meranda discusses some of the propositions which have
been advanced in support of the English rule. The first is that the rule
is an arbitrary one adopted for convenience. Mathematical simplicity,
as the court says, is not usually a sound basis for an equitable doctrine.
The second is that firm creditors give credit in reliance on firm assets
and not in reliance on the separate assets of the partners. This, of course,
is often not true. The third, that the estate to which credit is given is
benefited to that extent, is also not always true. After declaring that
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none of the above propositions is a sound basis for the rule, Rodgers v.
Meranda concluded that the preference of the individual creditors in the
separate estate resulted "as a necessary correlative" from the preference
given the firm creditors in the firm assets. As pointed out in Robinson
v. Security Co., 87 Conn. 268 (1913), this reason is scarcely better
than the ones discussed and rejected by the Ohio court. It may often
happen that the individual estates will pay out a large percentage to the
individual creditors and the firm assets will pay out a very small per-
centage to the firm creditors. This Connecticut case adopted the rule of
the Ohio statute that firm creditors to the extent that their claims are
unsatisfied by firm assets share in the separate estates of the partners
par passu with the individual creditors. A few other jurisdictions have
adopted the same rule. Barton National Bank v. Atkis, 72 Vt. 33
(1899), Freeport Stone Co. v. Carey's./dm'r, 42 W. Va. 276 (1896),
Pettyjohn v. Voodruff, 86 Va. 478 (189o). Still a different rule was
adopted by decision in Kentucky, Northern Bank v. Keizer, 63 Ky. 169
(x865), and by statute in Georgia, Johnson v. Gordon, 102 Ga. 350,
30 S.E. 507 (1897).
It is apparent that in the absence of the statute the non-depositor
creditors would have shared equally with the depositors in the partner-
ship assets, and that neither of them could have shared in the separate
estates of the partners until all individual creditors had been satisfied.
By the statute, however, the depositors were preferred above the
general creditors of the firm in the firm assets and were given an addi-
tional right to compete with the individual creditors of the partners in
the separate estates. In the light of the history of the opposing rules it
would seem that no other interpretation of the Ohio statute was possible.
D. M. POSTLEWAITE
WILLS
PUBLICATION AND REPUBLICATION IN OHIO - PROBABLE
EFFECT OF SECTION 10504-3, GENERAL CODE, ON THIS
PROBLEM
Ever since the decision of Collins v. Collins, I 1o Ohio St. 105,
143 N.E. 561, 38 A.L.R. 230 (1924) the Ohio view as to the requi-
sites for revival of a revoked will has been in doubt. In that case the
testator destroyed a codicil to his will by tearing it up with the intention
of restoring the will to its original condition. On the question as to
whether there had been a sufficient revival of the original will the court,
interpreting section 10562 (now 10504-54) General Code, held that
